Do countries compete for FDI by liberalizing their FDI policy regimes? Our measure of FDI policy liberalization is an event count of changes made by a country in a given year in the areas of approval procedures, sectoral restrictions, operational conditions, incentives, investment guarantees, foreign exchange, and corporate regulations to attract FDI. Using spatial econometric estimations on panel data for 148 countries during the 1992-2009 period, we find that favorable policy changes to the FDI regime in one country are positively correlated with FDI policy changes elsewhere (i.e., policy changes favorable to FDI from other countries, increase the likelihood of liberalizing FDI policy in the country in question). While low income countries compete among themselves for investment via the liberalization of FDI policy, competition is most fierce in those countries which are relatively more open to FDI. These results are robust to alternative weighting schemes, estimation methods, sample sizes, and controlling for the possibility of endogeneity.
Introduction
Do nation states compete for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI hereafter) by altering laws and regulations governing FDI policy? While there is much anecdotal evidence to suggest that they do, surprisingly enough, to the best of our knowledge there is no empirical evidence to support these claims. The present paper fills this gap in the international political economy literature by specifically looking at competition among countries in liberalizing FDI laws and regulations related to foreign ownership, approval procedures, sectoral restrictions, operational conditions, incentives, investment guarantees, foreign exchange, and corporate regulations. It is often argued that globalization gives footloose capital greater bargaining power while placing host country governments under pressure to liberalize laws and regulations governing FDI policy, thus leading to competition between countries to attract FDI. Countries also compete for FDI because it can yield a number of benefits for host countries, including the development of infrastructure, technology transfer, promotion of institutions conducive to economic growth, and improvements in managerial knowledge and the level of skill among the human capital stock -all necessary for a country to compete in global markets (Dunning 1993) . The main underlying argument here is that entrepreneurial politicians respond to capital mobility through a process of regulatory and incentive based competition, with the expectation that FDI creates job opportunities raising wages. This forms a huge political capital for incumbent politicians. Although competition for mobile capital is present among developed and developing countries, we believe that it is developing countries which compete more fiercely among themselves, as well as with developed countries, to attract FDI. Developed countries are not pushed as hard as developing countries to compete for mobile capital because they possess better infrastructure facilities and property rights protection, as well as stronger institutions and a more educated work force. This reduces the cost of conducting business, making them attractive destinations for FDI in the long run (Ahlquist 2006) .
Previous studies on the liberalization of FDI policy have examined the effects of openness (Asiedu and Lien 2004, Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007) , tax incentives (Banga 2006) , administrative barriers (Morisset and Neso 2002) and deregulation (Golub 2003 , Gastanga et al. 1998 ) to attract FDI. Although Korbin (2005) attempts to study the basic determinants of the liberalization of FDI policy, curiously, the key aspect of inter-country competition has yet to be explored. In this paper, we use spatial econometrics to examine whether changes in FDI laws and regulations which are favorable to attracting FDI in one country, are influenced by favorable changes in FDI policy elsewhere. We also examine if such competition is evident both within group as well as across various groups of countries.
Spatial econometrics has been used in the literature to explore the extent of competition in tax, environmental standards, economic policy reforms, bilateral investment treaties and labor standards, among others. Some of the initial studies that have used spatial econometrics to examine tax competition among developed countries include those by Davies, Egger and Egger (2003) , Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008) , Davies and Voget (2008) , Overesche and Rinke (2008) and Klemm and van Parys (2009) . Davies and Vadlamannati (2011) also use spatial econometrics to examine the extent of competition in labor standards among nation states to attract FDI and trade. Neumayer and de Soysa (2011) use a similar technique with a different weighting matrix and find support for a race to the top with respect to women's labor rights. Spatial econometrics is additionally used by Markusen, Morey and Olewiler (1995) , Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) , Beron et al. (2003 ), Murdoch et al. (2003 , Davies and Naughton (2006) and Perkins and Neumayer (2010) to explore the race to the bottom argument in the adoption of environmental agreements and policies. This form of econometrics has also been used in studies measuring the extent of diffusion of policy liberalization and investment treaties. For example, Pitlik (2007) and Gassebner, Gaston and Lamla (2011) find evidence of competition among countries to liberalize regulatory, monetary and trade policies, while Simmons and Elkins (2004) find that the adoption of economic practices is highly clustered, both temporally and spatially. Using subnational data in Germany, Potrafke (2012) finds that economic liberalization in one state is influenced by economic liberalization in a neighboring state. Simmons, Elkins, and Guzman (2004) also find that inter-country competition drives the signing of bilateral investment treaties 1 While most of these studies are cross-country analyses, to the best of our knowledge there is no evidence for competition among countries to liberalize FDI policy regimes in order to make the host destination more attractive to FDI. Our paper attempts to fill this gap by specifically focusing on competition among countries to attract FDI through liberalizing FDI policy regimes, further examining whether this competition is any different within and between developing and developed countries. Using information on changes in FDI laws and regulations in 148 countries during the 1992-2009 period, we find that changes in FDI laws and regulations which are favorable to FDI in one country, are positively correlated with the liberalization of FDI policy in other countries. Furthermore, we find that developing countries compete for FDI by relaxing FDI regulations more fiercely among themselves. On the other hand, we also find that the competition is intense in the countries which are relatively more open to FDI. Our results remain robust to an alternative weighting scheme and controlling for endogeneity. We interpret these results as direct evidence of interstate strategic interactions in the liberalization of FDI policy. It is beyond the scope of this study to examine whether such fierce competition among countries actually leads to a race to the bottom, or otherwise. We . 1 There are also other areas where spatial econometrics has been used. For instance, Cho, Dreher and Neumayer (2011) use it to examine the diffusion of anti-trafficking government policies. Also, Cao (2010) examining policy diffusion in taxation finds that the competition mechanism induced by network position similarity in the network of portfolio investment and that of exports causes policy diffusion in corporate taxation. leave it to a future research agenda to examine whether competition among states results in race to the bottom or race to the top.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 illustrates the reasons as to why countries compete for FDI. Section 3 describes the data used and the spatial econometric methodology in detail. Section 4 discusses the results and section 5 concludes.
Theory and Hypothesis
The 1990s witnessed a marked increase in economic integration which resulted in a dramatic increase in FDI inflows into developing countries. It is estimated that FDI inflows into developing countries during 1990s increased by about 520% (UNCTAD 2004) . This increase was a consequence of widespread liberalization of FDI laws and regulations.
According to Kobrin (2005) , the 1992-2001 period witnessed roughly 1029 changes in policies favorable to FDI in developing countries alone. While many developing countries started to frame policies in favor of FDI and reduce regulations for the entry of foreign firms in the 1990s, this trend became even more pronounced in the 2000s. Using a different measure of changes in FDI policy, Pandya (2010) finds that a median country, protecting about 40% of its industries from the entry of foreign firms in the 1970s, dropped its protection to about 12% by the end of 2000. These drastic changes in policies favoring FDI are a significant reversal from the 1970s and 1980s as the general consensus until the 1980s was that economic incentives had an ambiguous effect on economic growth, or no impact at all (Peters and Fisher 2004, Markusen and Nesse 2006) . Subsequent studies have shown that tax and other incentives have a significant effect on regional growth (Bartik 1993 , Phillips and Gross 1995 , Newman and Sullivan 1988 . Moreover, traditional economic growth theory highlights the importance of investment in attaining higher rates of economic growth (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004) .
The advent of the democratization process in the 1990s, with a large number of countries adopting free market economic policies, paved the way for competition between countries to attract investment. Along with basic economic and governance issues, attracting investment and job creation became a key priority for many governments in the post-reform period in the 1990s (Markusen and Nesse 2006) . Thus, governments today are forced to compete against each other to attract investment, which would not only generate jobs and boost their economies, but also form huge political capital for incumbent politicians. Even some autocratic governments have been forced to liberalize their investment policy regime to stave off anti-government revolts. China's aggressive liberalization of FDI policy following the post-Tiananmen square crackdown is one such example.
In fact, stylized theory in terms of the rewards of competing for investment can be derived from basic international trade models such as the 'Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson theory', the 'Ricardo-Viner model', and the 'ideology and inequality thesis' proposed by Dutta and Mitra (2006) , which all predict that trade will extensively benefit those countries with abundant factors of production compared to those with scarce factors. Extending the same analogy to the liberalization of FDI policy suggests that workers and farmers in poor countries will gain from the process of liberalization, where domestic capitalist rent-seeking forces are forced to compete with new foreign capital. Since developing countries are labor rich and capital poor, their openness to foreign investment is expected to benefit labor, while hurting domestic rent-seeking capitalists (see Pandya 2011 for similar arguments). Foreign investment can provide significant benefits for labor by creating better quality jobs that are associated with an increase in wages and better working conditions compared to those offered by existing local firms, thus resulting in a higher marginal revenue product of labor.
Competing with foreign firms operating at a higher level of labor productivity in turn forces domestic firms to increase wages (see Pandya (2010) , for example). Note that previous literature finds a positive impact of FDI and wage increases in both developing and developed countries (Huttunen 2007 , Almeida 2007 , Girma and Görg 2007 , Aitken et al. 1996 , Haddad and Hairrson 1993 .
In addition, workers and consumers could gain when goods become cheaper and access to better quality goods increases. As large sections of the middle class stand to gain, the electorate would prefer those governments which support capital importation (Jakobsen and de Soysa 2006, Bhagwati 1999) . The decision to allow FDI into the multi-brand retail sector by the Indian government in 2011 is a prime example of this. While farmers and agricultural labor associations openly supported opening up the retail sector to foreign investment, anticipating an increase in wages, this created back-end supply chain networks in the farming sector which eliminated middlemen and reduced product prices, which was vociferously opposed by lobby groups in domestic small scale industries (see Subramanya 2011, The Economist 2011). Moreover, competition theorists' argue that incentive competition not only creates jobs, but also increases the tax base of host countries. New jobs created by FDI also lead to skill acquisition, a transfer of managerial skills, and lower unemployment in host countries (Markusen and Nesse 2006) . These benefits, in turn, are expected to spill over to domestic firms leading to improved productivity, innovation in local markets and an increase in exports. It is also noteworthy that even if FDI does not flow in as a result of a country's provision of various incentives and deregulation, if the incumbent government believes that it does, then this alone could result in incentive competition among countries.
The other important change driving inter-state competition is the failure of state-led development policies in developing countries, which has led to free market economic systems and increased the bargaining power of FDI vis-à-vis governments. Because of these profound changes, countries which would be better off colluding to reduce the size of incentives offered to investors, i.e., so that there are net benefits to both investors and host countries, a country has the incentive to deviate from colluding, and offer incentives to investors individually. Due to the footloose nature of capital on the one hand, and competitive international political systems on the other, individual governments are left with no choice but to compete with their peers. This can result in bidding wars, leading to a prisoner's dilemma situation forcing states to compete aggressively to attract FDI through policy liberalization measures and the provision of various incentives for mobile firms. In fact, successive governments in many developing countries started to deregulate their FDI policies throughout the 1990s in their bid to attract FDI and signal to the investors after their competitors have done so. This type of fierce competition puts more pressure on smaller countries with even weaker bargaining power to follow suit to retain and attract mobile capital. Simmons and Elkins (2004) allude to the case of Chile in Latin America, who liberalized capital controls, subsequently leading to a wave of capital account liberalization in other countries in the region. Based on our discussion, we test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Potential host countries are more likely to change FDI laws and regulations favoring FDI when their competitors have done so.
A related issue that has not been explored is the nature of this competition between countries. Foreign investors are encouraged to set up in countries with strong economic fundamentals. Among the reasons put forward are market size, the level of income, skill level in the host country, infrastructural facilities, and political and economic stability (Blomstrom and Kokko 2003) . Usually it is argued that developing nations offer an environment less conducive to FDI inflows compared to developed nations. In such instances, the lack of infrastructure, skilled labour, property rights, and political and economic stability can be compensated for through fiscal incentives. According to Madies and Dethier (2010) , more than 70% of African countries use tax holidays as an incentive to attract FDI, compared to only 20% of OECD countries. Azemar and Delois (2008) argue that the level of statutory tax rates strongly influence the destination of Japanese firms, and may allow a country to compensate for disadvantages related to public good provision or governance. However, the influence of corporate taxes decreases with a high provision of public goods and better quality of public governance. Similarly, Haufler and Wooton (1998) show that that foreign investors prefer to locate in larger countries providing a higher producer price, even in the presence of higher tax levels. Imperfect competition leads small countries to offer lower tax rates relative to large countries in order to compensate for their small market size (Raff and Srinivasan 1997, Haufler and Wooton 1998) . Accordingly, we expect that the nature of FDI competition is fiercer in developing countries vis-à-vis developed countries. We therefore test:
Hypothesis 2: Competition to attract FDI via the liberalization of FDI policy is fiercer among developing countries.
Data and Methods

Model Specification
We use panel data covering 148 countries over the 1992-2009 (18 years) period. The baseline specification estimates the number of annual changes in FDI laws and regulations (which we describe in detail below) affecting inflows of FDI into country i in year t, which is a function of a set of exogenous variables it Z :
φ is the country specific dummy and t i ω is the error term. The control variables are drawn from the existing FDI literature and are described below. We now include competition with other countries by introducing the number of annual changes in FDI laws and regulations in other countries in year t to the baseline specification (1), a variable known in the spatial econometric literature as the spatial lag. We thus estimate: , i.e., the share that country i gives to country j is equivalent to j's share of the total GDP across all countries in our sample, excluding country i. 2 a large country. Moreover, the literature using spatial econometrics to examine cross-country competition has also used GDP as a weight (e.g., Davies and Vadlamannati 2011 , Vadlamannati 2011 , Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano, 2008 , Madariaga and Poncet 2007 , Pitlik 2007 .
We include country fixed effects to control for unobserved country specific heterogeneity in the panel dataset. We also include a time trend to capture other key reform measures taking place in each country. The time trend also captures factors which are not accounted for in the models, such as efficiency gains through technological advancements or enhanced management skills, which grow over time and can have a positive correlation with changes in FDI policy regimes. As the dependent variable here is a count of the number of annual changes in FDI laws and regulations, the preferred estimates are those from the maximum likelihood, zero-inflated negative binomial regression method (Brandt et al. 2000 and King 1988 ) with heteroskedasticity consistent robust standard errors (Beck and Katz 1995) . It is noteworthy that our dependent count variable not only exhibits a distribution that is strongly skewed to the right (accumulation of observations at zero), but also shows overdispersion (variance being greater than the mean -see descriptive statistics in Appendix 2) with excess zeros (zeros represent about 40%). To counter these problems, we make use of the zero-inflated, negative binomial method (Lambert 1992 , Greene 1994 .
Data
We use annual data for 148 countries from 1992 to 2009. Appendix 1 includes the list of countries used in our study. For the dependent variable, we make use of the number of annual changes in FDI laws and regulations which are favorable to FDI, which is the aggregation of changes occurring in the following categories: for each of these categories are described in appendix 2. This data is generated by UNCTAD, which has been collecting the information on annual changes in the FDI policies of respective countries since 1992. UNCTAD collects this information for its annual World Investment
Reports, which monitor and analyze global and regional policy trends affecting FDI flows.
As an initial step, UNCTAD collects these data from various sources ranging from the media and private consulting firms, to official government sources such as investment promotion agencies or respective ministries. In the second step, this information is sent to the respective (Kobrin 2005) . Accordingly, we include GDP per capita, measured in 2000 US$ constant prices (logged), as a proxy for the level of development in the host country. It has been argued in the literature that the benefits accruing from FDI are conditional upon higher levels of absorptive capabilities (Borensztein et al. 1998 ) and are thus more likely to benefit from FDI liberalization. Likewise, we control for the rate of growth in GDP of the respective host countries, which might be associated with the liberalization of FDI policy. We also include total labor force (logged) as a proxy for the support for new investments which are expected to push wages upwards. Following others, we incorporate a measure of democracy which takes the value 1 if Marshall and Jaggers (2002) polity IV index is equal or above +6 on the scale of -10 to +10, with higher values representing a greater level of democracy 3 (Robertson and Teitelbaum 2011, Pandya 2010 ).
Endogeneity concerns
In addition to these variables, we include oil export dependency, which is expected to have a negative effect on the liberalization of FDI policy. Oil wealth is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if oil exports exceed one-third of export revenue, and 0 otherwise. We also include a variable capturing the ideology of the incumbent government. Many studies have found ideology to be a key determinant of market economic liberalization process Potrafke 2012, Bjørnskov and Potrafke 2011) . The data on ideology comes from Beck et al. (2001) , which are coded as a value of 1 for leftist governments in power, and 0 otherwise.
Finally, using the dataset developed by Dreher et al. (2009), we include a dummy using the host country's participation in the IMF structural adjustment program as a proxy for external pressures to deregulate and liberalize the existing FDI policy regime (Kobrin 2005) . The details on definitions and data sources are provided in appendix 3.
The spatial lag variable is bound to be endogenous because if the liberalization of FDI policy in country i depends on that of country j, then the reverse is also true. In order to address this endogeneity problem, we utilize a non-linear instrumental variable estimation.
For the instruments, we use jt jit i j Z ϖ ∑ ≠ , i.e., the weighted average of the other countries' control variables, namely GDP per capita (log), the GDP growth rate, labor force, democracy, the oil exports dummy, government ideology, and IMF program participation.
The intuition behind using these variables is twofold. First, economic and political factors are found to be a very important force driving the liberalization of FDI policy. Second, for a given country j, these exogenous variables directly impact its FDI policies, but are not dependent on those in country i, thus satisfying both the instrument relevance and exclusion criteria.
Employing two-stage instrumental variable estimations (2SLS-IV) for non-linear models such as zero-inflated negative binomial may be problematic, and the relevant parameters are difficult to estimate directly. Therefore, we opt to regress our endogenous variable -the spatial lag -on the selected instrumental variables by using pooled OLS models (which are the first stage regressions). We then predict the values of the endogenous variable and regress our dependent variable -FDI policy liberalization measure -using zeroinflated negative binomial estimations (the second stage regressions). However, to check the validity of the instruments in the 2SLS-IV estimations, country fixed effects are employed.
As highlighted above, the validity of the selected instruments depends on two conditions. First is instrument relevance, i.e., they must be correlated with the explanatory variable in question. Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995) the FDI policy regime, suggests that a one standard deviation increase in changes in FDI policy in countries in the sample above the median, are associated with a change in policy of 0.43 in a given country i above the median. In contrast, we find the effects of the spatial lag in the sample below the median to be weak, which is statistically significant at the 10% level only (see column 2 of table 3). It is also noteworthy that the marginal effects of this subsample are smaller compared to any other subsample group and the global sample reported in table 1. In columns 3 and 4, we examine the cross-group competition between the two. Interestingly, we find that both these groups only compete among themselves and not with each other (see columns 3 and 4). Furthermore, the competition, as it appears from columns 3 and 4, is much fiercer among countries which are relatively more open to FDI. It is also noteworthy that if our results were simply capturing an overall trend in the liberalization of FDI policy, one would expect similar results for the above and below median groups because their trends are comparable. The fact that we find distinct results suggests that we are capturing something more than a mere trend in the dependent variable.
Empirical Results
Baseline Results
Before moving further, we focus on the extent of control variables in tables 1 to 3. As expected, the rate of growth in GDP is associated with a positive effect on the liberalization of FDI policy. On the contrary, however, we find a negative impact of GDP per capita (logged) on the liberalization of FDI policy. This is certainly a surprising result. A plausible explanation is that during our study period, high income countries had already liberalized their FDI policy regimes, while developing countries were still in the process of doing so. In table 2, which is our sample of developing countries, we do not find any statistical significance for GDP per capita. In line with our expectation, we find that the extent to which a country is operating under an IMF program, the more likely it is to liberalize its FDI policy regime. In fact, these findings remain robust across all tables. Likewise, we also find the more democratic governments are associated with liberalizing FDI policy, a result consistent with the findings of Pandya (2010) . The positive and significant effect of democracy on the liberalization of FDI policy is consistent across all tables. However, we do not find any support for the mere presence of a labor force and left leaning governments. These results mostly remain robust when estimating the models using IV estimations in table 4.
In table 4, we report the results based on zero-inflated negative binomial IV estimations. Note that columns 1 and 2 represent the global sample, while columns 3 and 4 represent the developing countries sample alone. Columns 1 and 3 capture the results of the first stage regressions estimated using the pooled OLS method, while columns 2 and 4 capture the second stage regressions using the zero-inflated negative binomial method. As seen from columns two and four, the positive significant effect of the spatial lag term remains robust in the IV models. Note that we have already included the lagged dependent variable in both these models and the spatial lag results still hold. The substantive effects for both the global and developing countries sample suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the spatial lag of the IV models is associated with an increase in the liberalization of FDI policy in country i by roughly 0.11. As highlighted earlier, to examine the validity of the instruments, we estimate 2SLS-IV models that report the statistics which explore the strength of the instruments. As can be seen here, the first-stage F-test and Anderson canon LR statistics report the test statistic used to test the null hypothesis, i.e., the parameter estimate for the instrument in the first stage regression is equal to zero. Based on Staiger and Stock (1997) , we treat F-statistics greater than 10 as being sufficiently strong. In table 4, we find that in all columns, the F-statistic is always greater than 10, which is significantly different from zero, at the 1% level.
Checks on Robustness
We examine the robustness of our main findings in the following ways. First, we use an alternative weighting approach where we weigh the FDI policy liberalization measure with the distance between each country, instead of GDP, under the presumption that a country closer to those countries with higher levels of liberalization in FDI policy are well placed to compete. We use the distance in kilometers from country i as the weighting scheme, so that more distant countries are given smaller weights. Hence, we use inverse distance, not distance, with a weighting as follows:
, , Africa and Turkey, i.e., the emerging countries group. Estimating our baseline models without these countries generate very similar results with respect to the spatial lag, which remains positive and significant, at the 5% level. In summary, taken together, the results seem to be very robust to sample size, specification, and testing procedure. The results of all of the robustness checks are not reported due to space considerations, but are available upon request. Given the robust evidence, we can safely accept the hypothesis of strong intercountry competition to attract FDI.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present the first set of empirical results exploring the possibility of competition between countries to attract FDI via the liberalization of FDI policy. Using spatial econometric estimations for a panel data of 148 countries over the 1992-2009 period, we find that favorable policy changes to the FDI regime in one country are positively correlated with changes to FDI policy in another. This does not imply that such competition is universal, however. We also find evidence that low income countries compete among themselves for investments through the liberalization of FDI policy, and that competition is at its fiercest among countries which are relatively more open to FDI. We interpret these results as direct evidence of inter-country strategic interactions in FDI policy. Our results also suggest several potential considerations for future policy and scope for further research.
Given that changes in FDI policy which are favorable to FDI in one country are positively correlated with FDI policy in another, local governments should ensure that this competition is welfare enhancing, leading to a more equitable spatial distribution of investment in host countries. Secondly, it is important to recognise the fact that the ability of a country to attract FDI via liberalization of policy is contingent on other factors that attract investment, such as domestic market size, property rights, and institutional quality, among others. Thus, if a country attracts more FDI as a result of dramatic liberalization of its FDI policy, our estimates indicate that this would force others to respond by competing more fiercely in liberalizing their FDI policy regime to avoid losing potential investment. This suggests that it may be important to be mindful of the implications of such fierce competition, as it might also result in race to the bottom. We leave this issue to future research, perhaps by usefully employing the comparative case study method to examine whether fierce competition among countries to attract FDI is leading to a race to the bottom, or otherwise. Notes: (a) Robust standard errors in parentheses in column 1 and 3 and Z-statistics in parentheses in column 2 and 4 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (b) Dependent variable in column 1 is the spatial lag for global sample.
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